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Natural disasters, from an economic perspective, are fascinating. Depending on the size 
and severity of the disaster, they can have a myriad of different effects on both the physical 
landscape and the population within it. This can include anything from mild power outages to 
destruction of property. Large natural disasters, like strong hurricanes, can also be very deadly. 
Even the type of disaster can affect what kind of damages occur and their severity. However, it is 
not only the size of the disaster that is important, but who it affects, how those who are affected 
react, and what support they may get in their recovery efforts. These are crucial factors because 
they focus more specifically on how the people react and respond to a disaster. It is also 
important because these factors focus more on the capacity to recover, rather than just the 
damages. Different areas have different capacities to recover for a variety of reasons. Data has 
shown that low-income households tend to be more vulnerable to exogenous effects than those of 
higher income. This is due to several reasons, such as less job security, higher rates of 
unemployment, and even a lack of development in areas of low income (Orthner 2004, p.160). 
The lack of development in low-income areas can inhibit rebuilding efforts due to poor 
infrastructure, as much of what was in place before would be unusable, as well as a weaker 
foundation to work from in general. The primary question for my research was how natural 
disasters affect low-income households compared to households of different income levels. The 
major questions that arose from this question were what the most important factors affected by 
the disasters, how people of various levels of income, primarily low income, were affected, and 
what mechanisms were put in place to help alleviate the damages done to the different income 
levels. I also analyzed trends within what were the most important factors, unemployment, and 




recover” from the disaster. This will include an autoregressive analysis of the unemployment and 
labor forces of the affected areas to identify trends within their recovery. I have defined low 
income using guidelines set by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ Community 
Services Block Grant (2004). They define a “low-income individual” as being an “an individual 
whose family income is at or below 150 percent of the poverty line.” Hurricane Katrina and 
COVID-19 had been chosen for research due to the copious amounts of relevant data and 
research that were available for them, relative to other disasters. Another reason for their study is 
because of the widespread damage they have caused, with their impacts being among some of 
the most devastating natural disasters in recent American history. Also, the effects of the 
disasters on the affected areas are clear when looking at the trends of the various indicators 
determined before. 
Literature review 
Vigdor's (2008) had researched various factors that were affected by Hurricane Katrina, 
historical trends of cities previously affected by disasters, and within New Orleans. Vigdor’s 
article details various economic impacts on New Orleans because of Hurricane Katrina, 
including relative employment changes by industry, demographic changes, and population trends 
from before and after the disaster. Vigdor also details some of the population trends from other 
disasters, such as the 1945 Dresden Bombings, the San Francisco Earthquake in 1906, and the 
Chicago 1871 fire. While these were not specifically natural disasters, they still exemplified the 
capacity for a city to recover from a disaster both financially and in terms of population. These 
disasters also served as a good point of comparison as to why other cities have recovered 
differently than Hurricane Katrina. Vigdor also analyzes the population trends of New Orleans, 




other cities. Though his analysis, Vigdor concludes New Orleans’ lack of industrial development 
and its long shrinking national importance as to reasons why its recovery has not been as robust 
as other cities. The other cities mentioned in the article, when they were affected by their 
disasters, were in stages of economic and population growth. New Orleans on the other hand, has 
had population and economic growth that was below national average even before Hurricane 
Katrina. Vigdor's analysis has provided great insights into some of the factors that are affected 
by natural disasters, in what ways they are affected, and how the history of an area can 
significantly affects its recovery.  
 Diana Enriquez and Adam Goldstein (2020) had investigated how low-income 
households were affected by the pandemic financially during the earlier months of the COVID-
19 pandemic. The study itself uses survey data from the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance 
Program, or SNAP. The article helped give more insight into the U.S. labor market and the 
prevalence of job insecurity, especially within poorer demographics. The study itself found that 
those with lower income and less skilled jobs had much less job security, leading to them being 
laid off more often. Twenty- seven percent of SNAP recipients had lost their jobs or were losing 
labor income in the first wave alone. These numbers grew from late March to early June, with 
twenty five percent more people also losing their jobs. The study also looks at how other factors 
of low-income households have changed due to the pandemic, like the increased accrual of bills, 
decreased housing security, and decreased food security. Enriquez and Goldstein had concluded 
that COVID-19 and the shutdowns had put an immense strain on lower income households and 
that any safety net programs or organizations were often unavailable or out of reach to the 




Matthew and Julia Raifman (2020) have done research into who was most at risk from 
the COVID-19 pandemic and discuss the implications of the data. Their data was gathered from 
the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, where they sent a survey to over three hundred 
thousand participants. In addition to income levels, the Raifmans’ also looked at the race and 
ethnicity of their subjects, analyzing any disparities between different races in addition to income 
groups. Through this data and analysis, they concluded that people who are black, American 
Indian, in an older age group, or were in lower income households were the most at risk from 
COVID-19. The paper also discussed some of the short comings and limitations of the study, 
such as the Surveillance System not including all risk criteria and that it would only really focus 
on those who were aware of their conditions. This would cause some inaccuracies in the data and 
raise the possibility that those with multiple factors could be at a higher risk. This research is 
extremely helpful for my paper, as it directly compares an individual’s risk to their income, 
giving a good estimate of what groups are most at risk, as well as strengthening my hypothesis. 
Elliott and Pais (2006) interviewed and surveyed over 1200 different Hurricane Katrina 
survivors in New Orleans and recorded their responses to the hurricane. Their analysis focuses 
more heavily on the social aspects of the disaster, looking at how both race and class had 
impacted the short-term responses to Hurricane Katrina. Through their gathering of data, Elliott 
and Pais set out to find out what groups of people were in most need of assistance in recovering 
from the disaster and to what degree. Their analysis was also given historical background, 
analyzing New Orleans’ past and how it feeds into the racial and class differences within the 
area. Their analysis looked at a variety of variables, such as housing, the timing of evacuations, 
and the short-term support systems. After analyzing and processing their data, they concluded 




the disaster. Specifically, they concluded that low-income black homeowners were the most in 
need of targeted assistance, as they were hit the hardest by a noticeable margin. This study was 
helpful in my analysis because it gives a direct look into the groups affected by Hurricane 
Katrina, including different income levels. It also gives a look into the recovery of New Orleans 
and the surrounding areas, helping to show their capacity to recover on a more local level. 
Lastly, it helps give more data and insight into the population trends and why the population is 
still lower than it was in 2000.  
 Cavallo and Noy (2010) have analyzed previous literature and summarized the state of 
economic literature examining the aggregate impact of disasters. They have analyzed a great 
number of previous studies and empirical work concerning disasters around the world to review 
the main disaster sources available, discuss the determinants of the direct effects a disaster can 
have on an area, and analyzes short and long run indirect effects of various disasters. They 
looked at literature concerning a wide variety of natural disasters from around the world, 
including earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, and droughts. Cavallo and Noy had found that 
disasters had caused permanent losses in population in many of the analyzed disasters, more 
attributed to people leaving the area rather than deaths caused by the disaster. This has had a 
negative effect on the economies of such places, as their labor forces would often shrink as a 
result. Their analysis had also covered a wide variety of different possible models to use, 
including the use of autoregressions, to analyze pre and post disaster trends and to predict future 
values. They had also noted that most of the disaster empirical analysis focused on changes in 
GDP to gauge recovery and that many other impacts of disasters have been under analyzed. 
Cavallo and Noy concluded from the other studies that governments are often hesitant to provide 




politicians are not blamed for the disaster damage. They are much more incentivized to provide 
relief after the disaster, as they are held more accountable for the recovery. While this is a much 
greater problem in other areas of the world, like in developing countries, this is still a prominent 
way of thinking in the United States. They have also concluded that the number of adverse 
impacts on an area is related to the ability to properly mobilize significant funding for 
reconstruction, with more adverse impacts reducing the mobilization of funding for 
reconstruction. Another conclusion was that long run effects of the disasters can be difficult to 
determine. This can be even more difficult to determine for areas that were already in economic 
downtrends, like New Orleans. This analysis has provided many frameworks for what kind of 
models to use for analysis and gave greater insights into the different effects of disasters in a 
variety of areas around the world, from countries to cities. While a developing country is not 
completely analogous to a single city like New Orleans, it does explain how the wealth of an area 
and population affects recovery efforts.  
Dolfman, Fortier, and Bergman (2007) have analyzed the local economy of New Orleans 
before and after Hurricane Katrina. They had given a thorough analysis of the industries within 
New Orleans, including average weekly earnings and the percentage of people employed in 
specific industries from 2000 to 2007. They also gave interpretations of the data, short-term 
analyses of post-Katrina damage, and predictions of the possible recovery New Orleans could 
have based off of the most recent information they had access to. From their analysis, they had 
concluded that the three largest industries in New Orleans at the time were tourism, port 
operations, and education. They had also analyzed that these were some of the industries that 
were affected the most by the disaster. Dolfman, Fortier, and Bergman had found that much of 




devastating, as they had also found that many of New Orleans’ jobs were in the lowest paying 
sectors, predominantly tourism. The elimination of these low paying jobs had been so severe that 
the average weekly wage for New Orleans had risen. From their analysis, they had concluded 
that, while taking a large amount of damage from Hurricane Katrina, the three largest and most 
prominent industries have retained their relative strength due to its growth from before the 
hurricane, from its recovery ten months after the disaster, and estimations from projections. This 
report had provided valuable information and insights regarding the three biggest industries in 
New Orleans, as well as providing more background as to why certain industries are more 
prominent than others. 
Disaster Analysis 
Hurricane Katrina and New Orleans  
Prior to Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans had had a declining trend in their labor force 
participation, with their statistics being lower than national averages. In 2000, New Orleans’s 
labor force participation rate was 61.2%, while the national average was 63.9%. Their 
unemployment rates have also made a slow increase over the past few years, with their 
unemployment rate of 4.1% being higher than the national average of 4.7% in 2000. The labor 
force itself had also been declining in New Orleans, as long-term trends have seen negative 
growth. In January 2000, New Orleans had 628,702 people in their labor force, while in January 
2005, there were 615,544. Median household income in New Orleans is also lower than the 
national average by over $6,000 (Vigdor, 2009). In terms of the types of jobs present before the 
hurricane, three industries stood out as being overrepresented in the population. Entertainment 
and accommodation, transportation and utilities, and public administration all had more workers 




the national averages. These were industry, information, and professional services. From this 
information, it is apparent that the most prominent industries were those in the service and 
tourism sectors, while many of the underrepresented industries tended to be more “white collar.” 
It should also be noted that New Orleans had a shortage of neatly 37,000 jobs in 2000, which 
would be needed to make the city’s employment to population ratio equal to the nations (Vigdor, 
2009). 
Hurricane Katrina was a devastating category five hurricane that caused massive number 
of economic damages. Hurricane Katrina had initially formed on August 23, 2005, starting as a 
tropical storm in the Southeastern Bahamas and traveling across the southern peninsula of 
Florida into the Gulf of Mexico. From there, it had intensified into a category five hurricane and 
made landfall in Southern Louisiana, where it primarily hit New Orleans and the surrounding 
area. As it continued further into America, it had begun to lose much of its power, becoming a 
tropical storm once again as it entered Mississippi. However, the damage done to New Orleans 
was massive, with estimated economic damages of $250 billion, the displacement of over 
770,000 people, and 1,833 people killed. Much of the infrastructure within the city had been 
damaged because of the flooding, as approximately 80% of New Orleans had become flooded. 
Much of the flooding has been attributed to the failure of the Federal levee system. While the 
whole city was hit hard, the hardest hit area was the 9th ward, a primarily low-income housing 
area full of more cheaply built and affordable housing near the canals. Much of the damage 
caused by Hurricane Katrina was in areas of higher poverty and higher unemployment rates, 
compared to the undamaged areas (U.S. House of Representatives, 2015). Damage to other 
buildings was also a big issue, as much of the business in New Orleans were small businesses, 




of the flood water had been pumped from the city and people had begun to rebuild (NASA, 
2005). 
Despite some claims that New Orleans should be abandoned, many of the residents had 
vowed to rebuild. New Orleans would begin to recover its lost workforce and rebuild much of 
what was destroyed. Over the next ten years, the labor force, employment levels, and 
unemployment rates would improve significantly, though not quite back to the previous levels 
seen before Katrina. Damage control and disaster relief during and after the storm primarily 
came from the Federal Emergency Management Agency, or FEMA. The primary goal of FEMA 
during the disaster was to alleviate the disaster damage as much as they could. This included 
preparing shelters, providing emergency aid, finding and rescuing survivors, and supplying the 
residents with emergency supplies, like food and drinkable water. FEMA’s response to 
Hurricane Katrina had been highly criticized for its ineffectiveness and lack of focus when aiding 
the citizens of New Orleans (Schneider, 2005). Most of the criticism comes from the lack of 
clear communication between those who were directly in New Orleans and their headquarters, a 
delay in the response to the disaster, and a failure to adhere to preestablished disaster procedures. 
There were also issues stemming from the damage done to the physical landscape and lack of 
coordination with the local institutions. An example of this is the collapse of telephone wires in 
New Orleans inhibiting the ability for FEMA to keep better communications between their 
workers. The lack of coordination with local institutions, such as with the bus lines, had led to 
more confusion amongst the front-line helpers and led to inefficiencies in helping victims. 
Lastly, a lack of preparedness within the organization had led to slower response times, 
inefficient handling of emergency supplies, and confusion within FEMA’s leadership. (Edwards, 




appropriations, with $75 billion of it going directly to emergency relief, not for rebuilding or 
recovery. These relief efforts included clearing debris, damage inspections, and hazard 
mitigation (Dari-Mattiacci, 2015 p.187). While helpful in the short term, it had not fostered much 
growth for the future, as there would be less effort and money put towards rebuilding the 
damaged buildings and businesses that would help restart the economy. However, New Orleans 
has still recovered from the damages from Hurricane Katrina, though not back to the levels of 
where it was before. Groen and Polvika (2008, p.48) had discovered, through their own research, 
that after the first year of recovery, much of the initial effects on the labor market had diminished 
overtime for those who evacuated, as people and businesses began to recover from the hurricane 
and adjust to the new economic and social situations. Those who did not evacuate had a much 
harder time recovering, as they generally came from areas that experienced greater housing 
damage and were much more affected by the storm overall. 
COVID-19 
The COVID-19 pandemic is a global natural disaster that is, at the time of writing, still 
ongoing. Originating from China, the disease has quickly spread all over the world over the 
course of a year, with massive economic and social repercussions to every country affected by it. 
The disease had slowed international trading and travel to a halt in the early months of its spread, 
causing massive damage to the global economy. While the pandemic is affecting the entire 
world, this paper will examine only the United States to keep a smaller and more focused view of 
the negative effects of the pandemic. In the United States, COVID-19 has been causing trillions 
of dollars in damages, some estimating over $16 trillion and still growing at a rapid pace, despite 
the country getting back into a more functional state of being (Cutler, 2020). Due to the 




businesses closing temporarily or trying to adjust to the new situation. As a result, many were 
laid off during the first few months of the pandemic as companies were restructuring. The height 
of the temporary unemployment was in April, with over eighteen million people temporary 
layoff. As of October 2020, the amount has lowered to three million. Many of these layoffs were 
temporary at the time, but there were still many permanent layoffs. As time went on and people 
had started to adjust, temporary unemployment numbers had dropped, but the number of people 
under permanent unemployment has been rising (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2020). This 
rise in permanent unemployment could also be attributed to more seasonal and cyclical reasons, 
though it has yet to be seen in the data, as the trend would have to continue for a longer period 
before any statements could be said for certain.  
Efforts to prevent the spread of the disease in the United States have been present. There 
was encouragement for the public to wear face masks, as well as “social distancing” policies that 
kept people at least six feet away from each other to stop or slow the spread of the disease. 
Businesses were required to enact social distancing and require face masks in their restaurants. 
Proper guidelines and procedures were released by the by the Centers for Disease Control for 
many institutions and individuals to prevent the spread of COVID-19, such as education 
facilities, governments at all levels, and healthcare departments (Centers for Disease Control, 
2021).  Failure for business owners to comply would result in their businesses being shut down 
or heavily fined, as they would become public health risks. There has also been the use of 
contact tracing to reduce the spread of the disease through the isolation of those who have been 
in contact with people who have had COVID-19. Those who may have been exposed were 
encouraged to quarantine themselves for two weeks to see if they had caught COVID-19.   These 




with the new restrictions in place. Small businesses ran a greater risk of going bankrupt, though 
the government has given subsidies to some businesses to keep them afloat. For a whole, only 
workers deemed essential could continue operating. Workers are defined as essential if their 
work involves operations and services that are typically essential to continue critical 
infrastructure operations. This covers a wide umbrella of workers and industries, some examples 
including caregivers, physicians, food delivery employees, nuclear power workers, and 
operational staff in water treatment plants (Categories of Essential Workers, 2021). 
Recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic is, at the time of writing, currently in effect. 
Vaccines are starting to be distributed to the public more rapidly and more businesses are starting 
to open their doors again. These two factors are especially important in boosting the economy 
because they allow people to be safer at work and in public, as well as allowing many people to 
return to their jobs if they were laid off from it due to the pandemic. Service industry and person-
to-person jobs are especially bolstered by this, as they would benefit more from both their 
workers and patrons being less susceptible to the virus. Financial aid from the U.S. government 
has also bolstered the recovery of various businesses and institutions. Most recently, the 
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 has been passed on March 11th, 2021 (Yarmuth, 2021). This 
bill aims to alleviate many of the costs and other financial burdens that institutions have gathered 
because of the continued impact of COVID-19. This includes providing funding to agriculture 
and nutrition programs, small businesses like restaurants and live venues, health care programs, 
and assistance for a variety of housing programs. It had also made up to $10,200 of the 2020 
unemployment compensation tax free. As of the time of writing, it is difficult to tell what effects 
the programs and acts like these will have on improving various factors, like the labor force or 





The initial findings of this study do point towards natural disasters having a much larger 
impact on lower income households for a wide variety of reasons. Looking at Hurricane Katrina 
and comparing it to disasters of a similar magnitude, such as the San Francisco earthquake, 
recovery has been slower, specifically in terms of population. This is in part due to, as mentioned 
earlier in the paper, the lack of strong economic stimulus in the area, higher unemployment in 
various sectors, and a slowly diminishing workforce (Vigdor, 2009). These factors fed into each 
other in a variety of ways, culminating in a more difficult environment for low-income areas to 
rebuild back to where they were effectively. The COVID-19 pandemic has also affected very 
similar areas, slowing down the economy, raising unemployment, and diminishing the workforce 
across the country, though not in the same distributions. For example, the data from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics shows that COVID-19 has caused a lot of disruption in the workforce, shown 
by the high rates of unemployment throughout the various workforces. Much of these high rates 
of unemployment and changes to the workforce happened in industries that tend to hire many 
low-income workers, such as the food service industry. This also exasperates one of the major 
problems that low-income households face, low jobs security and a lack of capital to pay for 
necessities, like rent and food. These two problems feed into each other, as they have little means 
to get out of their low-income situations due to the lack of funds to invest in education or 
training, while their lack of job security can make it more difficult to keep a steady and reliable 
source of income.  
Low-income households also tend to be in more precarious positions due to their low 
amount of funds. Due to costs of living and levels of income across the country, people with 




seen in New Orleans, where lots of low-income households were hit especially hard by the 
storm, specifically the 9th ward. It is also important to note how, even after much of the housing 
was destroyed in Hurricane Katrina, many low-income earners felt obligated to stay due to 
mortgage obligations. “Instead, they indicate that lower-income homeowners are more likely to 
report plans to return to their pre-Katrina communities than higher-income homeowners, both of 
whom are more likely to report plans to return than renters. These patterns hint that less-affluent 
homeowners will be the vanguard of secondary waves of return migration, perhaps not out of 
choice afforded by superior class resources but precisely the opposite: their mortgage obligations 
coupled with lower household incomes afford them less opportunity to pursue options 
elsewhere,” (Elliot, Pais, 2006, p. 315). After Hurricane Katrina, rent prices had also increased 
greatly. In 2000, most people in New Orleans would spend less than thirty percent of their 
income on rent. In 2013, “more than 58 percent of renters spent more than 30 percent of their 
income on rent, including 37 percent who spent more than 50 percent of their income on rent,” a 
relatively large change from the amounts paid before Hurricane Katrina (U.S. House of 
Representatives, 2015). 
Another issue that is often overlooked in low-income households is concerning their 
health. Low-income earners tend to have underlying issues that make them more susceptible to 
outside influences and to health problems. Studies have shown that low-income households tend 
not to visit doctors as much as high income earners due to lack of paid sick leave and a lack of 
money to pay off medical bills (World Bank, 2014). This would cause many underlying health 
issues to go unnoticed in many families, which may become more apparent or exasperated 
during these times of crisis. This would then greatly hurt the low-income workforce and cause 




Small businesses, a prominent hirer of low-income workers, also suffer more from 
disasters. One of the more prominent industries that are made up of these small businesses is the 
tourism industry. Studies on tourism have shown that, in times of great disaster, tourism tends to 
slow down a lot, due to people not wanting to visit places that may not be safe for them. New 
Orleans, having experienced a massive hurricane and flooding, would have had one of its major 
industries, tourism, crippled for a substantial amount of time while the city recovered. Many of 
the workers also worked in other small and local businesses also lost their jobs. Many small 
businesses were heavily affected by Katrina, either through the destruction of the property that 
their business was on or though the mass exodus of people who left to get away from Katrina. 
COVID-19 had massively slowed down world travel and caused many businesses to temporarily 
shut down around the world. This basically shut down the tourism industry for a while, putting 
more low-income jobs out of the market temporarily around America. Other small businesses 
also had to shut down temporarily from COVID-19, as they were not able to do business in the 
pandemic effectively. 
Low-income had also meant housing of poorer quality, as shown in Katrina, with many 
of the 9th district housing being poorer in quality and cheap to buy to be more affordable to those 
with lower income levels (U.S. House of Representatives, 2015). This had caused them to be 
much more susceptible to the hurricane and its damages. Many of the houses were destroyed by 
the hurricane and the flooding, preventing a lot of people from being able to move back. 
However, as mentioned earlier, many who could move back did out of obligation to their 
mortgage (Elliot, Pais, 2006, p. 315).  Much of the population affected by Hurricane Katrina, 
specifically within the 9th ward, were low-income earners and lived in cheaper and low-income 




susceptible locations. While this is not as applicable to the COVID-19 pandemic, due to it having 
no effect on buildings and only on people, it is an important factor in analyzing more physical 
disasters. 
High unemployment from COVID-19 heavily affected the service and jobs where a 
physical presence was needed. Many of these “blue-collar jobs” were vital for those with lower 
incomes, as many of those jobs tended to be low-income jobs. Some of these industries included 
service jobs, retail trade, and tourism. Hurricane Katrina had a similar impact on similar in-
person industries. The main difference between the two disasters was with the construction 
industry, as Hurricane Katrina had caused a spike in the amount of construction workers in New 
Orleans at the time, while COVID-19 had slowed down the construction industry (Dolfman, et 
al., 2007). Information regarding COVID-19 shows that those in lower to middle income levels 
have been struggling much more due to a lack of funds to support long periods of time with no 
income, as they have lost their jobs. Levels of homelessness have also been rising amongst those 
demographics, as many cannot afford to pay their bills. 
From previous research done on the topic, the most prominent barriers to recovery were 
found to be a lack of employment and a low number of active small businesses (Rouhanizadeh, 
2020, p. 5). While these factors are important to note, it is also very important to know how these 
factors come into being. Knowing why employment is lacking or why there is a lack of resources 
can help people better understand how the situations can change depending on the circumstances 
and decide on the best course of action in providing aid. This is important for all recovery, but 
especially for those in more difficult circumstances, as they would be the ones benefitting from 





For Hurricane Katrina, data has shown that, directly after the disaster, the labor force had 
seen a sharp decrease from 621,538 workers in August 2005 to 572,140 in September 2005. The 
labor force would then continue to decrease, hitting its lowest point of 484,124 in February 2006 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2021).  Over the next seven years, it would begin a steady increase, 
with the peak of the labor force being 590,008 people in June 2013. The largest increase in the 
labor force happened between December 2009 and January 2010, with the labor force jumping 
from 541,555 to 559,626, a growth of 17,707 people. The labor force had also been shown to 
fluctuate slightly throughout the year, showing that there still was some seasonal trends within 
the overall growth.  This data is shown in Graph 1. 
 
When Hurricane Katrina had initially landed, unemployment had seen a large spike. 
From August to September 2005, the unemployment levels had increased from 33,903 to 89,131. 
These levels would hold until December, where unemployment had dropped from 89,677 in 
November to 43,544 in December. This is consistent with previous findings and research, as at 
around this point, many would have either left New Orleans all together, would have been 













































































































also a noticeable increase in unemployment starting from May 2008 until August 2010, with the 
increase going from 20,706 to 49,013. This coincides with the 2008 financial crisis, a major 
market disaster involving the collapse of the housing market in the United States. This has had 
negative effects throughout the country, causing great losses in GDP and increasing 
unemployment. From that point, unemployment would begin a slow decent downwards, with 
some seasonality applying to the trends. This can be seen in Graph 2. 
 
An important factor of low-income trends would be the wage amounts themselves. As 
there is not enough data to do a proper regression analysis, I will analyze general trends within 
the wages in New Orleans from 2005 to 2013 based on the data available to determine how 
wages may have been affected by the disaster. The three biggest industries before Katrina were 
tourism, port operations, and education. (Dolfman, et al., 2007). Each of these industries has a 
variety of subsectors. Dolfman had included information about these different industries within 
his analysis. Tourism includes the arts, entertainment, recreation, accommodation, and food 
services. Tourism is the most prominent and important of these industries in terms of the labor 


















































































services primarily focus on higher education, with colleges and universities making up much of 
this sector. Port operations and Education services have had the some of the highest wage 
earnings. Port operations had made an average weekly wage of $1,118. Education services had 
an average weekly wage of $1,117. Another industry worth noting would be construction, which 
had an average weekly wage of $1,076. At the same time, much of the tourism sector had been 
making far below the average weekly wage for all industries of $981. Tourism itself had an 
average weekly wage of $394. This makes tourism the primary source of low-income jobs. After 
the hurricane had hit, many people had been laid off or left the labor force all together. However, 
there were interesting changes in the average weekly wages, as in Q2 2006, port operations had 
increased to $1,391, education services had decreased to $883, and tourism had increased to 
$458. Construction had also decreased to $1,006. This information can be interpreted several 
ways. The biggest point of comparison would be the changes of the wages in comparison to the 
percent changes in employment. Every single industry had seen their employment decrease 
except for the construction industry, which increased by 27% from 2005. New workers being 
hired by the construction company are more likely to be paid less than those who were hired 
more recently, as they would have less seniority within the company and possibly less 
experience. A decrease in the average weekly wages for education services could be a result of 
professors and other teachers leaving to get away from the storm, possibly staying wherever they 
had moved to. Teaching also requires more training, so they would be harder to replace, 
especially those who work at colleges and make more money. Damages to school buildings may 
have also forced some to leave and find work elsewhere. Tourism’s decrease in employment but 
increase in average weekly wage could be attributed to many of the less lucrative tourism 




would be more likely to have the money to recover and to pay its employees more than other less 
popular and less paying businesses. However, as Groen and Polvika (2008) had researched, some 
of the local economy will begin to settle around 13 months after the disaster. Analyzing data 
farther into the future will give a better idea of how well various had recovered after the disaster 
and giving a better idea of their capacity to recover. 
 Looking at yearly data provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics from May 2007 to 
May 2013, many of the port operations had seen an increase to their average hourly wages. Data 
regarding much of the other port operations has been reclassified under “Transportation and 
Material Moving Occupations” but will still be referred to as “port operations” for the sake of 
clarity within the paper. Data regarding average weekly wages is unavailable, so average hourly 
wages will be used instead, as it is a similar and more available measurement for analysis. Mean 
hourly wages have increased from $14.29 in 2007 to $17.84 in 2013. The total number employed 
had decreased slightly from 40,680 to 39,540, though this decrease could be attributed to 
seasonality, rather than an overall decrease in the amount of people employed. Education 
services had seen much clearer growth in terms of wages and total amount of people employed. 
Total number of people employed had grown from 22,870 making an average of $20.51 an hour 
in 2007 to 28,480 being employed making an average of $22.51 an hour in 2013. Lastly, tourism 
has been split into two different categories, “food preparation occupations” and “personal care 
and service occupations”. Food preparation occupations had seen little wage growth from 2007 
to 2013, with 48,000 people working for an average of $8.51 an hour in 2007 to having 56,730 
people working for an average of $10.21 an hour. Personal care occupations have also seen little 
growth, as 11,440 people were working for an average of $10.34 a week in 2007, growing to 




that require less education, such as being an usher, waiter, or tour guide, are often the ones that 
paid the least. They were also some of the slowest growing jobs in terms of wage, as they had 
stayed in the low-income range and well below the average hourly income for all occupations of 
$20.42. The trends within the lower income industries show that, while they hire many people, 
they are usually paid well below the average hourly rates. From this, it can be gathered that 
Hurricane Katrina did more heavily affect the low-income job and labor market in the short term 
of a year, with larger reductions to the labor force and smaller wage increases compared to other, 
more well-paying jobs. In the long term, the labor force for the low-income jobs had grown back 
more significantly than higher income jobs, though the wages for some of the low-income jobs 
had not grown as significantly as the higher income jobs. 
COVID-19 had caused a sharp drop in the labor force for the United States. The labor 
force in February 2020 had 164,448,000 people participating in it. In March, the number had 
dropped to 162,721,000 people. The largest drop in the labor force had come in April 2020, with 
the number of participants dropping to 156,478,000. From April to June, the labor force would 
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staying at more consistent levels in the low to mid 160,000,000’s. From July 2020 to March 
2021, the labor force would grow from 160,085,000 to 160,558,000. This data can be seen in 
Graph 3. While large increases in the labor force may not be happening as of March 2021, 
measures to increase virus prevention and business activity have recently been enacted, which 
could see greater increases to the labor force. 
Unemployment from 2018 to February of 2020 had been consistently and slowly 
decreasing. From January 2018 to February 2020, unemployment had decreased from 6,496,000 
to 5,717,000 people. COVID-19 had initially entered the United States at around March, causing 
some companies to lay off their employees. This had caused unemployment to increase from 
5,717,000 to 7,185,000 in March. There was then a massive increase in unemployment in April 
as stricter restrictions were imposed and companies were left to figure out how to handle the 
disease. Unemployment had greatly increased to 23,109,000 in April. From April, 
unemployment levels would decrease consistently until August. Unemployment had fallen to 
20,975,000 in May, 17,697,000 in June, 16,308, in July, and then finally 13,542,000 people in 
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become flatter, causing unemployment to decrease at a much slower rate than before. From 
September 2020 to March 2021, unemployment levels would fall from 12,535,000 to 9,710,000. 
This data is shown in Graph 4. Much like the labor force, this slower trend of decreasing 
unemployment may not last as long, as more measures are being approved to help alleviate much 
of the damages caused by COVID-19. This may lead to larger decreases in unemployment soon.  
Unemployment by industry gives a good inference into how different people of different 
income levels are affected. I will be using the “Labor Force Statistics from the Current 
Population Survey” from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to analyze changes in unemployment 
from March 2020 to March 2021. Like the analysis for New Orleans, there is not enough data 
currently available to give a proper regression analysis, so this will be an analysis with the 
context of the information already known, such as unemployment and the labor force. Between 
March 2020 and March 2021, unemployment has increased substantially across almost all 
industries. One of the hardest hit industries is the leisure and hospitality industry, as it had gone 
from 1,131,000 unemployed in 2020 to 1,625,000 in 2021, an increase of 494,000 people. This 
industry includes food services and accommodations. The trends in unemployment and wage 
data are like what was seen in Hurricane Katrina, as previous wages of $16.89 an hour in March 
2020 had risen to $18 in April, when the disaster hit. This could be, as said earlier, due to the 
lower wage workers being laid off, causing the average income values to inflate more. As more 
people were bought back to work, the wage had gone back to levels like those before COVID-19, 
as by June 2020, wage had lowered to $17.02. Other low-income jobs, like various jobs in retail 
trade, had followed similar patterns to this, with wage briefly fluctuating upwards as people had 
become unemployed. This is a much different trend than what happened with more high-income 




large amounts of money, with the average hourly wage being $42.75 as of January 2020. This 
industry has seen relatively little unemployment compared to many other industries, with their 
employment rates between March 2020 and March 2021 falling from 2,419,000 to 2,338,900. 
However, as their employment fell, their average hourly earnings had also fallen, if slightly, 
moving from $43.07 in March and April to $42.45 in May. By February 2021, however, the 
average hourly wage had gone back up to $44.31. Similar patterns were found in other high 
paying industries, like finance, with unemployment not affecting them as much and their average 
wages being minimally affected. This shows that disasters tend to affect lower income jobs much 
more than higher income jobs, as they tend to cause much more unemployment for the lower 
income jobs.  
Methodology 
For my empirical analysis, I used an autoregressive model with varying amounts of lag. I 
found this to be the one of the most accurate models when predicting future values and for 
analyzing the overall trends with recovery of the affected variables. The model has varying lags, 
as the different data sets had required different amounts of lags to produce the most accurate 
modeling results. I had decided to analyze the unemployment levels and the labor force as 
reported by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. These factors were chosen to be analyzed 
because of their importance to the recovery of an area from a disaster, as shown by previous 
literature, and availability of monthly data to forecast and analyze trends more accurately. 
The autoregressive model is represented as: 




Where Y is the labor Force or unemployment, B0 is the intercept, Bx is the lag coefficient, and y 
is equal to the labor force or unemployment in the previous month. et represents the error from 
period t. The data sets were tested for stationarity using the Dickey-Fuller test. The time series 
data was initially not stationary, so I had differenced the data to give the different sets 
stationarity. After the data had become stationary, I had begun to run the autoregressions on 
them.  
For Hurricane Katrina, I analyzed the amount of people who were unemployed and in the 
labor force in the New Orleans parish from January 2006 to December 2013. I chose these dates 
to analyze the recovery from the disaster when the labor force was at its lowest point. This was 
to help give the best idea of its recovery trends without the influence of Hurricane Katrina itself. 
I chose to end in 2013 as I felt it was a long enough time period to get an accurate depiction of a 
long-term recovery of New Orleans from Hurricane Katrina with minimal interference from 
other outside influences. 
For COVID-19, I analyzed the civilian labor force and unemployment rate in thousands 
of people for the entire United States from January 2018 to March 2021. This range of data 
includes data from before COVID-19, as there would not be enough data points to make a proper 
and more accurate model if I only included data from after COVID-19’s appearance. I have 
chosen January 2018 as a starting point to get a large enough sample size for the data set. I have 
chosen March 2021 as my ending date as it is the most recent information available.  
Empirical analysis 
This first regression analysis was on New Orleans’ differenced labor force data, with the 





Table 1     
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.833425     
R Square 0.694598     
Adjusted R 
Square 0.680393     
Standard Error 6478.491     
Observations 91     
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 4 8.21E+09 2.05E+09 48.89892 2.18E-21 
Residual 86 3.61E+09 41970845   
Total 90 1.18E+10       
      
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value  
Intercept 3.024501 679.2452 0.004453 0.996458  
Lag 1 -1.27608 0.093631 -13.6289 3.37E-23  
Lag 2 -1.32302 0.134405 -9.84353 9.46E-16  
Lag 3 -0.9128 0.133878 -6.81816 1.21E-09  
Lag 4 -0.45124 0.092934 -4.8555 5.32E-06  
 
This data, with its .694 R squared value and low P-values, suggests a strong correlation 
between previous months and the current month’s labor force values. This means that the 
previous months have had a noticeable impact on the outlook of the directly future months. The 
coefficient for the first two lags suggests that 1.26 and 1.32 of the previous two values had been 
used in determining the future values. The second lag had had the most impact upon the future 
data, as it has the largest coefficient, while the fourth lag has the weakest affect upon the data, 
due to its low coefficient. All the coefficients being negative and the large standard error means 
that there was fluctuation between positive and negative values during regression calculations, 
reflecting the fluctuations in the changes of the labor force. Much of this fluctuation in the labor 




amplified by the differencing within the data in order to achieve stationarity, widening much of 
the gaps between the changes in the labor force. A small standard errors with the coefficients 
implies that the lagged coefficients are accurate and will give accurate results, as there is little 
variation between the upper and lower 95% and the coefficient.  
The next autoregression I had conducted was with the differenced unemployment levels 
in New Orleans, as shown in Table 2. This data had been differenced three times to remove 
stationarity. 
Table 2     
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.819556598     
R Square 0.671673017     
Adjusted R 
Square 0.656222335     
Standard Error 5270.16544     
Observations 90     
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 4 4829684354 1207421089 43.47206389 8.19464E-20 
Residual 85 2360844720 27774643.77   
Total 89 7190529075       
      
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value  
Intercept -322.1448022 555.7347561 -0.579673664 0.563668019  
Lag 1 -1.27384511 0.10547851 -12.07682126 3.90497E-20  
Lag 2 -1.135537593 0.158381136 -7.169651799 2.57117E-10  
Lag 3 -0.834814243 0.158080989 -5.28092749 9.73233E-07  
Lag 4 -0.505366195 0.104605507 -4.831162423 5.94891E-06  
 
This regression, with a .672 R squared value and low P-values, also suggests a strong 
correlation between unemployment in the previous month and unemployment in the current 




labor force, there is still a clear indication that 67.2% of the variability in the future observations 
of unemployment are explained by past observations and that the past values do have a 
noticeable impact upon future. The negative coefficients and large standard error once again 
represent the large changes in unemployment and the differencing. The smaller standard errors 
for lags 1 and 2 demonstrate the accuracy of their predictions, as there is little variation between 
the upper and lower 95% ranges and the coefficients. The standard errors for lags 3 and 4 are 
relatively larger to their coefficients, meaning that there is a wider margin of error for their 
predictions, especially for lag 4. However, as their coefficients are smaller, those past variables 
do have less of an effect on the predictions, meaning the predictions and general trends are still 
accurate.  
The next regression will analyze the differenced United States labor force during 
COVID-19, with the results shown in Table 3. The data had been differenced four times to 
remove stationarity. 
Table 3     
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.888863187     
R Square 0.790077765     
Adjusted R Square 0.757782037     
Standard Error 2563.695898     
Observations 31     
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 4 643158129.6 1.61E+08 24.46385 1.73E-08 
Residual 26 170885953.1 6572537   
Total 30 814044082.8       
      
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value  
Intercept 14.83691293 460.6288171 0.03221 0.97455  
Lag 1 -1.513328626 0.166565734 -9.08547 1.5E-09  




Lag 3 -1.070149473 0.268920097 -3.97943 0.000493  
Lag 4 -0.530262964 0.168296038 -3.15078 0.004069  
 
This regression, with an R squared of .79 and a low P-values, suggests that the 
relationship between the past and future values of the labor force is strongly correlated with each 
other. This means that the past values do have a strong influence on the predicted and future 
values. The large standard error and negative coefficients reflect the fluctuating labor force and 
effects from differencing. The standard error of the lags indicates that there is greater variation 
between the coefficient and the upper and lower 95% of ranges, meaning the prediction is less 
accurate. The large and sudden negative change in the labor force from COVID-19’s effect on 
the United States would have also contributed to larger standards of error.  
The last autoregression will analyze the differenced unemployment levels of the United 
States, with the results in Table 4. The data had been differenced four times to remove 
stationarity. 
Table 4     
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0.892807908     
R Square 0.79710596     
Adjusted R 
Square 0.765891492     
Standard Error 6234.926739     
Observations 31     
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F 
Significance 
F 
Regression 4 3970843987 992710996.8 25.5364265 1.12194E-08 
Residual 26 1010732097 38874311.44   
Total 30 4981576085       
      




Intercept -25.77360561 1119.859122 -0.023015043 0.981814001  
Lag 1 -1.607562859 0.176357684 -9.115354803 1.40646E-09  
Lag 2 -1.629617124 0.294627075 -5.531118013 8.3214E-06  
Lag 3 -1.066478741 0.294772851 -3.617967993 0.001255492  
Lag 4 -0.437653394 0.176501628 -2.47959976 0.019956305  
 
This regression, with a moderate R squared of .749 and a low P-values, suggests that the 
relationship between the past and future values of the unemployment levels are strongly 
correlated with each other. The stronger coefficient in the second lag suggests that 
unemployment from two months ago have a greater influence on the future predicted values than 
the first month by a small margin. The coefficients all being negative, and the large standard 
error also reflect large changes within the unemployment from COVID-19 and effects of 
differencing, much like the labor force. The higher standards error within the lags means that 
there is greater variation between the coefficient and the upper and lower 95% of ranges. 
Implications, Conclusions, and Further Research 
From my analysis, I have concluded that natural disasters tend to disproportionately 
affect lower paying jobs more than higher paying jobs. The negative impact upon these low 
paying jobs had caused many of their workers to be laid off or for their jobs to become 
unavailable due to the damages caused by the natural disaster. This, in turn, had caused a large 
increase in unemployment within predominantly low-income households. Higher income jobs 
tend to be much less affected by natural disasters, as they often have higher job security and the 
work itself is less affected by any damages done by natural disasters. Many low-income jobs 
require physical labor and interaction to function properly, which are often aspects that are 
inhibited by natural disasters. However, efficient relief and recovery efforts can greatly help in 




sooner. Inefficient actions taken by FEMA during Hurricane Katrina have had the consequences 
of not properly rebuilding New Orleans, slowing their recovery. While efficient recovery 
techniques are useful in healing from natural disasters, more preventative measures against 
natural disasters, such as better infrastructure and insurance, can help prevent damage from being 
done to the labor force. Expanding upon this paper, further research into a greater variety and 
number natural disasters, analyzing different aspects of them and how they affect factors like the 
labor force. I was unable to properly get enough data to research more into these subjects for this 
study.  Further research into different models for the “capacity to recover,” can also provide a 
more fleshed out and specific picture as to what directly affects recovery in certain areas. It is a 
somewhat abstract concept, with room for interpretation. While I have found that unemployment 
and labor force have best fit this criterion, there are still other factors that go into determining 
how much an area or its people can recover from a disaster. It is a wide issue with many smaller 
factors. However, I feel that this model does provide an accurate depiction of the recovery trends 
of the most important factors and, as such, the recovery of the affected areas. Panel data studies 
can also be done for widespread disasters like droughts of COVID-19 to get a better idea of how 
they affect areas differently. Future research can also more effectively analyze the trends with 
COVID-19, as data regarding its long-term effects do not exist. Lastly, future research into how 
race affects the recovery or vulnerability of a population could add to my findings, as much of 
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Force unemployment         Year Month 
Labor 
Force unemployment 
2006 Jan 484966 33307  2010 Jan 559626 43419 
  Feb 484124 23687    Feb 557904 38176 
  Mar 492389 22927    Mar 564678 39708 
  Apr 493837 21208    Apr 571973 39259 
  May 496673 21746    May 571045 42354 
  Jun 510118 26029    Jun 580599 48811 
  Jul 509252 21893    Jul 578434 48032 
  Aug 505605 21831    Aug 574851 49013 
  Sep 504307 21874    Sep 572674 46812 
  Oct 514675 20771    Oct 573898 45925 
  Nov 518159 20185    Nov 573539 45616 
  Dec 517404 17847    Dec 569512 43510 
2007 Jan 515234 21784  2011 Jan 566277 48276 
  Feb 515120 18433    Feb 564647 43217 
  Mar 521766 18737    Mar 569614 43293 
  Apr 514833 18372    Apr 567851 40684 
  May 516447 20335    May 568304 42849 
  Jun 525856 24347    Jun 575064 49039 
  Jul 525087 22493    Jul 573933 46906 
  Aug 516897 20624    Aug 570044 45726 
  Sep 514906 20326    Sep 568449 43940 
  Oct 525451 17592    Oct 572423 43194 
  Nov 529482 17593    Nov 570136 39195 
  Dec 528636 17853    Dec 565934 38654 
2008 Jan 525790 22262  2012 Jan 561833 44116 
  Feb 523463 18077    Feb 561596 40241 
  Mar 529705 20047    Mar 567095 40467 
  Apr 534418 17876    Apr 570435 37568 
  May 534197 20706    May 573939 40832 
  Jun 545734 27338    Jun 581452 47291 
  Jul 545517 26787    Jul 582397 45393 




  Sep 546163 31944    Sep 570554 39115 
  Oct 547983 29361    Oct 576990 37534 
  Nov 543638 27632    Nov 574391 34239 
  Dec 543469 28336    Dec 573742 35971 
2009 Jan 538578 34217  2013 Jan 576627 44785 
  Feb 538751 32439    Feb 575321 38955 
  Mar 539612 33303    Mar 575718 38317 
  Apr 543372 32843    Apr 577946 36798 
  May 543829 35264    May 580266 39760 
  Jun 552492 43048    Jun 590008 45907 
  Jul 555092 41565    Jul 586598 43301 
  Aug 550977 40043    Aug 584202 40852 
  Sep 544462 38179    Sep 581360 38480 
  Oct 546870 36866    Oct 583528 35945 
  Nov 546190 34709    Nov 585521 31972 
  Dec 541555 35327    Dec 580434 28888 
 
 
Appendix B: United States Raw Data (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics) 
Year Month 
Labor Force (in 
Thousands) Unemployment (in Thousands) 
2018 Jan 160992 6496 
  Feb 161764 6590 
  Mar 161765 6499 
  Apr 161914 6551 
  May 161897 6209 
  Jun 162200 6432 
  Jul 162316 6130 
  Aug 161735 6167 
  Sep 161985 6037 
  Oct 162471 6164 
  Nov 162713 6115 
  Dec 163124 6379 
2019 Jan 163067 6442 
  Feb 163032 6128 
  Mar 163010 6201 
  Apr 162737 5995 
  May 162848 5965 




  Jul 163586 5969 
  Aug 163861 6000 
  Sep 163958 5728 
  Oct 164278 5922 
  Nov 164447 5907 
  Dec 164579 5844 
2020 Jan 164455 5796 
  Feb 164448 5717 
  Mar 162721 7185 
  Apr 156478 23109 
  May 158200 20975 
  Jun 159797 17697 
  Jul 160085 16308 
  Aug 160818 13542 
  Sep 160078 12535 
  Oct 160718 11049 
  Nov 160536 10728 
  Dec 160567 10736 
2021 Jan 160161 10130 
  Feb 160211 9972 
  Mar 160558 9710 
 
Apppensix C: New Orleans Differenced Data and Graphs 
t 
Labor Force 3 
Differences 
Unemployment 
3 Differences t 




1 -15924 -9819 48 28289 20110 
2 8205 3216 49 -7975 -8756 
3 9221 1488 50 -8744 5525 
4 -24920 -12164 51 18705 -182 
5 11530 12493 52 -22201 -10598 
6 5130 -3969 53 10301 8996 
7 9317 -1251 54 2824 -4942 
      
8 -18550 1663 55 1995 4496 
9 2645 -2269 56 -4984 -736 
10 2824 8027 57 -2085 -2375 
11 3471 -13563 58 4460 8669 
12 4704 10943 59 813 -16697 
13 -20339 -4324 60 4992 14960 




15 -752 -279 62 8946 7459 
16 -17973 -7915 63 4091 -749 
17 2757 5851 64 -14198 -12348 
18 13620 1586 65 5133 9276 
19 6337 -4007 66 5052 -1559 
20 -19050 5171 67 3275 1646 
21 1637 -2476 68 -11830 -4293 
22 2877 3890 69 4346 6711 
23 2519 -12743 70 2016 2545 
24 8050 14749 71 3763 -15340 
25 -10098 -10296 72 1872 13438 
26 -3405 9142 73 -7895 -7226 
27 16692 -1199 74 2323 9288 
28 -23512 -10985 75 3845 -2968 
29 10346 9085 76 -10577 -11552 
30 5304 553 77 -2077 7371 
31 -4347 -8844 78 12202 476 
32 -5714 7243 79 7022 2323 
33 10341 1579 80 -19614 -3527 
34 -8898 2744 81 10985 6741 
35 9786 -12836 82 1584 2055 
36 -4376 10301 83 -7725 -21726 
37 2211 -3966 84 5894 19836 
38 -6202 4205 85 128 -6073 
39 11509 2482 86 -1739 5362 
40 -14269 -14630 87 7330 -1296 
41 -652 9228 88 -20574 -11938 
42 4315 -303 89 14166 8910 
43 11323 893 90 -1460 -80 
44 -12011 -1395 91 5456 -240 
45 -867 3619 92 -5185 -1275 
46 26661 4699 93 -6905 2327 







Appendix D: United States Differenced Data and Graphs 
t 




1 -1233 -865 
2 800 1496 
3 -993 -2049 
4 -3 1954 
5 2038 -1370 
6 -2123 930 
7 115 -857 
8 893 922 












0 20 40 60 80 100











0 20 40 60 80 100




10 1127 338 
11 -499 940 
12 -255 -1430 
13 899 1121 
14 -932 -652 
15 552 324 
16 -862 -257 
17 694 -149 
18 314 1048 
19 -775 -1444 
20 488 836 
21 -333 -98 
22 592 -109 
23 -2210 1624 
24 -959 11331 
25 15277 -45423 
26 -20571 49428 
27 6906 -13881 
28 2938 -6299 
29 -3672 6402 
30 4771 -5374 
31 -5055 3882 
32 3237 -2480 
33 -1685 -107 
34 1543 2005 
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